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INDIVIDUALISM IN THE AGE
OF INTERNATIONALISM
Alyson Cole*
THE EMPOWERED SELF:

LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF

By Thomas M. Franck. New York: Oxford
University Press. 1999. Pp. xiii, 312. Cloth, $ 45.
INDIVIDUALISM.

.

In the brief conclusion to The Empowered Self" Law and Society in
the Age of Individualism, Thomas M. Franck asserts that he cannot
satisfactorily summarize his book's argument. Even if it were achiev
able, he clarifies, he would not engage in such an endeavor, since it
would "preempt the reader's autonomy and subvert his or her individ
ual rights" (p. 278). That the author himself rejects the desirability of
doing what reviewers generally do (i.e., condense and inevitably sim
plify complex tomes) is perhaps a somewhat awkward way to com
mence a discussion of his book. Nevertheless, this comment illustrates
the extent to which Franck champions individual liberties and rights. It
is also indicative of the declaratory tone of his prose: Franck reports
observing "signs of tectonic change" (p. 278), indicating that we have
reached "truly an historic watershed" (p. 195) of a "glorious self
invented future" (p. 45), or, as he puts it elsewhere, the "new dawning
of a spirit of individual assertiveness" (p. 60). Ironically, while he
seems to encourage diverse readings, his text, for the most part, relies
on a rhetoric of inevitability, leaving the reader little room for alterna
tive views.
Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International
Studies at New York University, Franck has earned a distinguished
reputation in the field of internat.ional law. In this new study, he
adopts quite an ambitious framework that, beyond legal matters, cov
ers a vast terrain, from the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of the
"new economy,'' to the history of the state over the last 300 years and
fundamental disagreements in political theory. His argument about
the global ascendance of individualism progresses through an explora
tion of the changing balance of power among a trinity of "rights claim
ants" - the state, the individual, and the group - as measured by
their respective capacity to determine personal identities. This, in turn,
is gauged largely, but not exclusively, through the construction and
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., Smith; M.A.,
Ph.D., University of California-Berkeley.
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application of international and national laws. The increasing power of
individuals to be masters of their own identities comes at the expense
of the other two vertexes of the triad - states and groups. Global de
velopments in economics, communications, and urbanization have also
facilitated a new elasticity of personal identity. But most conducive to
"the age of individualism" has been the eroding of the eighteenth cen
tury Vattelian structure,1 which conceived of the world as comprised
of well-defined, solitary states, and of universal well-being as resting
upon states' uninfringeable sovereignty. Franck sincerely hopes that
his work will advance this process.
The Empowered Self is not solely for the specialist; its audience
will likely include many beyond the field of law. Overall, it is a lucid,
comprehensive, and timely analysis. It successfully draws from a re
markably wide array of materials to build a coherent synthesis.
Franck's juridical focus endows discussions of identity-formation which frequently slip towards the speculative and the ephemeral with a concreteness that is refreshing, if not always entirely convinc
ing. Moreover, the global reach of the comparativist approach brings
new perspectives to persistent debates over identity politics in North
America. The portrayal of the new international jurisprudence is per
haps the book's greatest contribution. Unlike the former global system
that hinged on (and enhanced) the autonomy of states, the new ar
rangements are linked with the rights and freedoms of individuals.
Franck reveals an aspect of internationalism that has been overshad
owed by other, much hyped, elements in the new world order, such as
the burgeoning market economy and the distance-shrinking effects of
the Internet. These, as well as the accelerated process of democratiza
tion wGrldwide, are related to, and yet distinct from, the phenomenon
described in The Empowered Self Franck's assessment is especially
important today when the prospects of internationalism raise fears and
anxieties across the American political spectrum. Unfortunately, he
takes a fine point too far by interjecting into the work a celebratory,
millennial discourse and indulging in an excessively optimistic futur
ology.
1. EMER DE vAITEL, THE LAw OF NATIONS 1 (Luke White trans., 1792) (1758). Franck
rightly characterizes Vattel as John Locke's transnational cousin, for Vattel argued:

(N)ations or states are political bodies, societies of men united together to procure
their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union.
Such as society has its affairs and interest, it deliberates and takes resolutions in com
mon, and thus becomes a moral person, having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself,
and is susceptible of obligations and laws.
Id. The Vattelian model acknowledged neither group nor individual rights. Efforts to protect
minorities in the aftermath of World War I served as the foundation for international recog

nition of groups' rights, eventually emboldening secessionist groups. This asymmetry in the
triad would only be addressed after the Second World War, when the individual was seen as
needing protection by international laws.
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The old order imposed rigid identities on individuals, mainly be
cause states demanded exclusive loyalty from their citizens. Hostility
toward the Other was also constitutive of certain identity configura
tions within national communities as well as among them, perhaps
most notably through the capitalist/communist divide (p. 78-79). Par
ticularly restrictive in this regard was the hybrid of the nation-state, a
fictive union that largely depended upon the myth of a cohesive citi
zenry sharing ties of blood and memory. In the aftermath of the Cold
War, and with the waning of the nation-state, other factions beckon
individuals for their allegiance, emphasizing linguistic, religious, ethnic
and racial affinities. Still, Franck confidently maintains that recent
eruptions of ethnocultural strife - in places such as the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, or even some of the more divisive quarrels of the
"culture wars" in the United States - are aberrant "growing pains" in
a larger trend toward greater international cooperation, on the one
hand, and strong individualism on the other. " [I]ndividuals are now,
for the first time, making free, genuine choices in determining their
own identities" (p. 40). Rigid factionalism is in retreat, and will likely
disappear once we stop fearing our new heterogeneous global exis
tence. In this version of a Kantian Weltburgertum, individuals will di
vide their diverse interests among transnational groups rather than
conform to inflexible collectivities.
Franck discerns compelling support for his position in the un
precedented flexibility of current citizenship. In contrast to the famil
iar "resident alien" status, new arrangements .allow individuals to sus
tain layered or overlapping nationalities. For example, the
intercitoyennete of the European Union enables citizens of each state
to acquire many privileges of citizenship in all . other member states,
including the right to vote in local elections, or even to run for office
(p. 64). Another indication of the weakening of the state is that it no
longer reigns as the sole guardian of rights. Individuals may approach
international tribunals directly. In fact, citizens can use these courts to
wage disputes against their own governments. Franck admires the
precedent set by the European Torture Convention in particular. The
convention-based and other NGO forms of adjudication and moni
toring seem promising ways to secure individual liberties without
placing undue burdens on less affluent states, even though problems of
access and compliance, as well as the risk of retaliation, remain.
The foundational principle of the age of individualism is freedom
of conscience (p. 150). Franck emphatically rejects the idea that the
globalization of freedom of conscience is a consequence of Western
cultural imperialism, pointing to its support by indigenous elites. Kofi
Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, thus avers that
viewing liberal humanism as ethno-specific (whether the charge is that
such values are a luxury oi an imposition) is "truly demeaning of the
yearning for human dignity that resides in every African heart" (p.
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148). Furthermore, if the notion of freedom of conscience may be read
into traditions of tolerance, especially toward the religious Other, the
historical record provides sufficient evidence that non-Western socie
ties have often accommodated dissenting views and differing practices.
Conversely, respecting difference, religious or otherwise, has not been
a hallmark of Western civilization, whose history of persecuting mi
norities and dissidents is all too familiar. Questioning the conventional
hierarchy between Western and non-Western does not, however, pre
vent Franck from rearticulating this hierarchy in temporal terms. He
not only presumes that vying for core rights associated with Western
liberalism is a universal trait, but, subscribing to a teleological model,
he also postulates that all human societies are differently located on a
trajectory that will lead them from "communitarian uniformity" to in
dividual self-expression.
Market globalization and advanced technology have also expanded
identity-making options, for instance, in terms of vocational prefer
ences or even the possibility of physiological changes. Franck attempts
to evaluate the level of social acceptance accorded such decisions by
analyzing legislation and court cases (for "the social indicator is, usu
ally, a legal one") that address three domains of personal transforma
tion - name, sex, occupation - in addition to various aspects of pri
vacy (e.g., sodomy, abortion) (p. 151). Some of the most interesting
material in The Empowered Self emerges from the restrictions that
many countries still impose on name alterations, maintaining that no
menclature is a public matter crucial to the nation's stability. In
France, for example, the government ferociously protects its control
over name assignment and reassignment. Stringent regulations make it
exceedingly difficult to alter one's name with a few notable exceptions
·
to promote francisation, as in the case of making a "Jewish name"
sound less foreign, "less Jewish." Even the far more flexible common
law tradition in Britain stops short of being completely adaptable, dis
allowing, for example, incarcerated persons the privilege of changing
their names, since renaming would make future surveillance too diffi
cult. In Italy, the parliament fought over and then defeated a proposal
that would permit matrilineal assignment of surnames, a crusade led
by none other than Benito Mussolini's granddaughter, Allesandra.
Equally fascinating are the comparative perspectives on the legal
status of sex reassignment, both prenatal (in most instances, abortion)
and postnatal choice (typically transexuality). For all of the scientific
and social advances, sex reassignment in most parts of the world is
now increasingly permissible and yet officially closeted. Thus, in Brit
ain, the national health system may fund the medical procedure, but
the state will not acknowledge gender transformation in other ways.
In recent years, international law has tended to side with the rights
of individuals to make choices of this kind. The International Cove
nant of Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), for instance, upholds
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married women's prerogatives to retain their maiden names. Article
121 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to give an
other example, certainly helped decriminalize sex acts between con
senting adults in various parts of the world. Franck trusts that interna
tional bodies will go further in securing, for example, official
recognition of sex transformation. He does not consider, however, that
such legislation may itself be inherently deficient as a guarantor of
freedom with respect to identity. As Kristin Bumiller and Wendy
Brown have argued, the legal protection model may actually restrain
or fix identity by inscribing particular and/or partial definitions.2
Franck's writing about collectivity reveals a degree of ambivalence.
He maintains "[t]he need for community appears as strong as ever,
even among those who carry more than one passport" (p. 74). None
theless, it is both his professional opinion and his political preference
that groups will not replace the state in affixing identities to individu
als. This segment of the book relies heavily on prescriptive argumenta
tion. While the empowerment of the individual and the corresponding
disempowerment of the state may have overt legal manifestations, the
relationship between the individual and the group does not readily
lend itself to the same sort of codification.
For identity to be genuinely contingent, self-chosen, and multiple,
group boundaries must be permeable. Frank proposes two additional
principles to achieve the requisite Calderesque balance among the
parts of the identity triad. First, he recommends allowing for local
autonomy (including legal autonomy), especially for geographically
insular groups (e.g., Native American tribes' exemption from civil
suits) and for the perpetuation of some forms of cultural difference.
Second, in the case of irreconcilable claims between groups and the
state, he asserts that universal norms should trump particularism (pp.
246-52). This is akin to the primacy of the individual in the triad, since
the individual stands for a universal principle. Unlike the other rights
claimants, his or her rights are unacquired, natural, and therefore non
transferable.3
Franck, not surprisingly, supports only the integrationist strains of
multiculturalism and suspects all claims guided by the precept of
group survival as typically "the self-interested preferences of [the

2. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY
(1995); KRISTIN BUMILLER, DIE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: DIE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
THE VICTIM (1989).
3. P. 282. Here he relies on Kant, Williams, and
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF (1973);
to be a Person, in ETHICS AND BASIC RIGHTS 131 (Guy

Mulholland. Cf IMMANUEL KANT,
(Lewis White Beck trans., 1969);
Leslie Mulholland, The Innate Right
LaFrance ed., 1989).
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group's] current power-elite."4 Still, he is careful never to slip from the
language of integration to that of assimilation. He presents regulations
that allow religious Jews to wear yarmulkes in the military or Sikhs to
don turbans under their construction hats as positive models of pre
serving markers of difference post-integration. The question remains,
however, whether most cultural groups' rights can be similarly re
duced to individual rights. When multiculturalism means more than
the (literal) wearing of different hats, or the assortment of fast food
options available at the food court in a suburban mall, accommodating
diversity becomes far more complicated.5
At the same time, Franck seems rather uncomfortable with the im
plications of extreme individualism. He recruits expressions such as
"new communitarianism," "networks of interdependence" and "com
munities of personal autonomy" to modify what otherwise might be
construed as a celebration of narcissism. He wants to convince the
reader that his individualistic universe will not bring a new age of al
ienation and anomie. Unfortunately, his model communities do not
entirely ameliorate such apprehensions. He valorizes arbitrary and
momentary encounters among free-floating, abstract (truly bodiless
and accent-free) entities, borrowing Howard Reingold's discussion of
relations in cyberspace "where I can participate in a hundred conver
sations with people who don't care what I look like or sound like, but
who do care how I think and communicate" (p. 91; quoting Reingold).
A second set of problems revolves around the perils of inequality.
For the most part, The Empowered Self minimizes the extent to which
self-creation, or even self-designation, remains the province of elites,
although the list of global self-imagining "individuals" includes trans
national corporations. Franck concedes that invigorated individualism
may entrench and deepen inequalities, "magnify[ing] the 'natural' ad
vantage of those already favored: by social rank, family cohesion, edu
cation and economic well-being" (p. 255). Social disparities will likely
hinder the delicate equilibrium within his rights triad since the interna
tional regime seems presently (and for the foreseeable future) ill
equipped to handle inequality within and among societies, especially
in comparison with the state, whose power over the last century was

4. P. 250. Separatists seek cultural, social, and political autonomy, whereas integration
ists seek protection (through antidiscrimination legislation) and, at times, assistance
(through programs such as affirmative action). Membership in a separatist group is absolute
and enduring, while affiliation with an integrationist group is infrequent and temporary. Pp.
225-28.
5. What I call the "food court multiculturalism" resembles Fish's discussion of "bou
tique
multiculturalism."
See
Stanley
Fish,
Boutique
Multiculturalism,
in
MULTICULTURALISM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69 (Arthur M. Melzer et al. �ds., 1998).
For a discussion of the limits of the individual cultural rights paradigm, see Adeno Addis,
Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 615 (1991).
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much augmented by attempting to address this very predicament.
With a few exceptions, such as the (as yet not ratified) Declaration of
Human Responsibilities (of which he ultimately disapproves), the no
tion of responsibility to those left behind is still not an ideal promoted
by international bodies or jurisprudence. Moreover, Franck's version
of liberalism cannot sustain a conception of social responsibility that
might compel the haves to assist the have-nots. All he can propose is
that "the recognition of a 'right of persons to be left alone' must go
hand in hand with a universal right of persons not to be left behind"
(p. 256).
The Empowered Self is so preoccupied with individual freedom of
association that it also ignores the lingering inequities among groups.
Franck's argument thus elides the majoritarian implications of alleg
edly neutral or objective rights. As Will Kymlicka (among others)
warns, minorities will always be uniquely vulnerable to nonminorities.
Abstract, universal laws, which allocate equal rights to all individuals,
do not resolve this imbalance.6 Furthermore, the principle of unen
cumbered exodus may be less pertinent to the actual conditions of
members of certain disadvantaged groups (determined by, say, race or
gender). There is a larger issue at stake here: identities often spring
into being through complex acts of attribution and recognition (or in
terpellation) that cannot be explained within Franck's triadic relation
ship.7
Moreover, Franck conceives of the Self (i.e., the self-directing, self
determining, autonomous self) as a natural entity that requires only
protection from external intrusions. He does not subject the Self to the
sort of critical scrutiny that assists him in exposing the contingent, ar
bitrary, and fictive elements in the making of the nation-state and
other "imagined communities."8 A substantial scholarly literature has
undertaken the task of historicizing the Self and underscoring the rela
tively recent social, political, and cultural forces that produced the
ideology and practices of the "autonomous self." (Michel Foucault's
6. Cf WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995); LESTER C. THUROW,
THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE
(1980); Robert Paul Wolff, The Concept of Social Injustice, in FROM CONTRACT TO
COMMUNITY: POLITICAL THEORY AT THE CROSSROADS 65 (Fred Dallmayer ed., 1978). A
related issue Franck might have addressed in greater detail is the concern, as expressed for
instance by critical race theorists, that legal neutrality presumes and requires assimilation.
See, e.g. , DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
7. For just two examples beyond texts already mentioned in this Review, see JUDITH
BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997); FRANTZ FANON,
BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967).
8. Franck seems to take Benedict Anderson's thesis on nations as "imagined communi
ties" too literally; the constructed nature of nations does not render them less stable or less
powerful. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983).
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work, which he mentions in passing, comes to mind.) For all of the
gestures that Franck pays to "postmodern" sensibilities by seeming,
for instance, to rejoice in the fluidity, multiplicity, and indeterminacy
of identity, his argument upholds a notion of a centered, ahistorical
Self always capable of assuming control over its own making.9 This is
not to deny the increased malleability of identity today. Were this not
the case, "identity" would not be the focus of so much anxiety. None
theless, the notion of self-making is a conceptual slippery slope that,
when taken to the extreme, assumes "self-birthing" of the Horatio
Alger school.
One manifestation of Franck's adherence to an inflated idea of the
Self is the ease with which he decouples the individual from society.
His vision of "communities of personal autonomy" does not account
for the many ways in which relations of interdependence govern inter
actions between individuals and collectives qua collectives. Since the
notion that individuals (identities included) are products of their cul
ture and time has become such an article of faith in American acade
mia (at least in the Humanities), this idea (as well as its excesses)
needs no further explication here. It is somewhat surprising, though,
that Franck, who makes the occasional attempt to anticipate his critics,
either ignores this approach or, alternatively, maintains that the exter
nal social forces that molded the individual are now receding from the
stage of history (at least in their capacity to impose identity). The
book thus seems to engage in an "end of history" type of argument.
Occasionally it seems that Franck conflates identity-making with
procedures of rendering preferences in the marketplace - hardly the
process of "inner dialogicality" Charles Taylor so thoughtfully expli
cates in his discussion of the rise of the modern Self.10 True, since the
turn of the twentieth century, consumption has had a key role in con
figuring individuals' self-understandings and self-presentations, but
consumption does not exhaust the means and methods of producing
such signification, nor have market decisions been bereft of collective
cultural patterns. A market approach to identity ignores the way in
which the medium of selection (the marketplace) itself functions as a
differentiating mechanism that creates hierarchies regardless of the
content of specific choices. In addition, the book minimizes the differ-

9. Numerous references to "multiple" identities aside, Franck's conception also seems
rather one-dimensional. For a critique of this sort of "tootsie roll metaphysics," see
ELIZABETH v. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN (1988); Deborah King, Multiple Jeopardy,
Multiple Consciousness, in FEMINIST THEORY IN PRACTICE & PROCESS 75 (Micheline
Malson et al. eds., 1989).
10. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1994).
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ences among various types of affiliations, the diverse circumstances
under which they may emerge, and their disparate social functions.11
These weaknesses in the theoretical apparatus of The Empowered
Self do not diminish the book's importance as an exploration of a new
internationalism. Testifying to a stronger transnational commitment to
privilege human rights over diplomatic and other political exigencies,
the recent struggle over the prosecution of the Chilean dictator
General Augusto Pinochet may support Franck's argument. The 2000
United States census furnishes another illustration of the greater flexi
bility of self-identification, including the possibility to register multiple
affiliations. The census suggests other lessons as well, however, for the
choice it offers is a limited one, restricted to a few specific designa
tions. Perhaps, counterintuitively, expanding options may actually
have served to deepen personal investments in these classifications.
Some allegiances, evidently, are more important than others, and
ethno-racial categorizations seem to be as ingrained as ever.
The book needs a more nuanced understanding of identity and a
less conventional reiteration of Lockean liberalism. While opposed to
"binary categorization" in other contexts, Franck divides the theoreti
cal terrain between himself and conformist communitarians, evading
significant portions of contemporary theory highly relevant to his
topic.12 David Hollinger, Will Kymlicka, and other scholars who have
recently grappled with the relationship between individuals and collec
tives have benefited from incorporating into their analyses and pre
scriptions insights culled from the multicultural moment.13 At times
Franck's empowered Self appears to resemble Hollinger's "post
ethnic," who may choose to affiliate with her "community of descent."
But such similitude is deceptive, for unlike Hollinger's "rooted cos
mopolitan," Franck's self-making internationalist is rootless. Hollinger
eschews the problematic of "identity" by limiting his theorizing to "af
filiation," for "the concept of identity . . . can hide the extent to which
1 1 . The fact that social groups may not have essential, enduring characters does not
make them somehow less real. For more on the contingent and relational nature of group
identity, see, for example, WILLIAM CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC
NEGOTIATIONS OF A POLITICAL PARADOX (1991); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); IRIS MARION YOUNG,
JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
12. Many of those Franck lumps together in the communitarian camp do not rightly
belong there. While Amitai Etzioni, Adeno Addis, Michael Sandel, and Will Kymlicka all
argue against abstract individual rights, there are more profound differences among them
with respect to the role they give to collectivity and the kind of collectives they seek to pro
tect. Even with the adjectival modifier "radical," it is a bit of a stretch to classify Addis, for
instance, as a communitarian, especially when he explicitly divides his critical ire between
individualists and communitarians. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE NEW GOLDEN RULE (1996);
KYMLICKA, supra note 6; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENTS (1996);
Addis, supra note 5.
13. DAVID HOLLINGER, POST-ETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM
(1995); KYMLICKA, supra note 6.
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the achievement of identity is a social process by which a person be
comes affiliated with one or more acculturating cohorts."14 Franck, in
contrast, translates every mode of choice and allegiance into the lan
guage of identity. Perhaps his understanding of the place of the indi
vidual in the new world order follows too closely (and ironically so) in
the footsteps of the old Vattelian view: autonomous, sovereign, self
determining nation-states are replaced in his conception with autono
mous, sovereign, self-determining individuals. While Franck does
much to undermine the former myth (the "naturalness" of the nation
state ) , he wholeheartedly embraces the latter.

14. HOLLINGER, supra note 13, at 6. Likewise Brodkin, in her discussion of how Jews
came to be classified as "whites," insists on distinguishing between "ethno-racial assign
ment" and "ethno-racial identity": the former is imposed and the latter chosen within the
limits of this imposition. KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS: AND WHAT
THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA 3 (1994).

